

TYPICAL SOVIET/COMMUNIST MOVES IN NEWLY-EMERGING NATIONS

PHASE OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT	A	B	C	D
	<u>COUNTRY CHARACTERISTICS</u>	<u>KEY SOVIET OBJECTIVES</u>	<u>OFFICIAL SOVIET STATE ACTIVITY</u>	<u>UNOFFICIAL SOVIET SUPPORTED ACTIVITY</u>
I PRE- INDEPENDENCE	1. Colonial status.	1. Identifica- tion of <u>bloc</u> as champion of indepen- dence.	1. Statements and propa- ganda welcoming inde- pendence, advertising "friendship for ex- ploited peoples".	1. Preparation of Party cadres e.g. cells in trade union or youth groups, indoctrination in USSR.
	2. Increasing nationalism.			
	3. Agitation for Early indepen- dence.	2. Encouragement of anti- Western out- look.	2. Exacerbation of friction with administering power e.g. in Trusteeship Council.	2. Contacts with local nation- alists including exiles.
		3. Organizational preparation to exploit future independence.	3. Survey of country con- ditions e.g. visit under UN auspices, questions in Trusteeship Council.	3. Non-official radio and other extremist propaganda directed to country.
			4. Expanded studies in the USSR about country.	4. Activities to discredit moderate elements.

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II EARLY STATEHOOD	1. Independence granted.	1. Establishment of <u>bloc</u> presence.	1. Rapid diplomatic recognition.	1. Communists remain in background; support nationalist leadership.
	2. New government lacks administrative competence and organization.	2. Identification of USSR as source of economic and political support.	2. Quick offers of trade and aid; trade mission established.	2. Coalition of extremist elements in a "national democratic front" to apply left-wing pressure on government.
	3. Strong expectation of economic development.	3. Weakening or disruption of Western economic and political ties and promotion of neutralism.	3. Exchange of official visits.	3. First efforts to place agents and malleable officials in key organizations e.g. police, press and information, agrarian reform, education, trade unions.
	4. International recognition and prestige are a primary aim.		4. Cultural exchange, scholarship programs, etc. to mould opinions of the local elite.	4. "Black" propaganda effort to arouse country against West and "imperialist agents".
			5. Increase in official propaganda to and concerning area e.g. radio, publications.	5. "Front" groups founded e.g. Friendship societies, to promote cultural, economic and other ties with <u>bloc</u> , and penetrate key strata.
			6. Encouragement e.g. by propaganda and "technical advice", of national measures to restrict Western influence, exclude foreign capital, discourage foreign investment.	
			7. Flattering attention e.g. publicity to local heroes and achievements.	

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III RELATIVE STABILITY	1. State machinery is tolerably efficient.	1. Reinforcement of bloc presence and diplomatic influence.	1. Encouragement of economic realignment e.g. trade and payments agreements; purchase of critical surpluses; under-selling or out-bidding Western competitors.	1. More active infiltration of key ministries and non-governmental organizations.
	2. Government of one man or single party retains popular support.	2. Promote neutralism and frustrate Western efforts to develop new relationships with the area.	2. Area economic surveys made and development projects begun e.g. dams, roads, factories.	2. Communists collaborate with extreme nationalist anti-Western elements.
	3. Economic development and international recognition continue to be central objectives.	3. Lay basis for future Communist leadership of "national revolution".	3. Increase in bloc personnel in country e.g. as advisers, Russian language and vocational school teachers, technicians, etc.	3. Propaganda media and "fronts" very active; advertising bloc aid and policies.
	4. Opposition cliques exploit social tensions in bid for power.		4. Play for sympathy of the military e.g. by training missions, sales of equipment.	4. By means of propaganda, strikes seek to disrupt cooperation with West e.g. aid programs, stabilization schemes, "monopoly" investment, etc.
			5. Identification of pro-Soviet anti-Western moves with "peaceful coexistence" e.g. to promote support for bloc foreign policies.	5. Diversionary agitation for "vigilance" against imperialist agents and for solidarity in "national liberation front".
				6. Agitation begun for agrarian reform, nationalization to develop the "class struggle".
				7. Pressure to remove all restrictions on activities of pro-Communist elements e.g. "peace partisans", left wing editors, etc.

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IV APPROACHING CRISIS	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Ruling party splits into factions, new parties form or merge with opposition.</li> <li>2. Increasing restiveness among key social groups e.g. military, students, street crowds.</li> <li>3. Economic dislocations dramatize government shortcomings.</li> </ol>	<p>Carry forward previous objectives and, in addition:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Exacerbate and exploit crisis.</li> <li>2. Immobilize or destroy anti-Communist nationalist elements.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Continued efforts to saturate country with delegations, trade and aid programs, gestures of friendship, etc.</li> <li>2. Diversionary effort to assure country of Soviet non-interference and to alarm it about "imperialist" plans for intervention.</li> <li>3. Where possible, subtle pressure to secure ouster of key anti-Communists.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. "Fronts" and Party active in encouraging opposition and spreading anti-Government propaganda.</li> <li>2. "Evidence" uncovered compromising important non-Communists and Western governments.</li> <li>3. Party militants organize for action.</li> <li>4. Tests of strength between CP-led mass organizations and nationalists.</li> <li>5. Struggle for control of key ministries and organizations enters crucial phase.</li> </ol>

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<p>V UNSUCCESSFUL RESPONSE BY LOCAL GOVERN- MENT: ALTERNATIVE I</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Regime overthrown by Communist supported opposition.</li> <li>2. Country on verge of civil war.</li> <li>3. Weak regime rules by balancing Communists and nationalist opponents.</li> <li>4. General breakdown of administration and economic dislocation.</li> <li>5. Anti-Western prejudices given free rein.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Develop intimate ties with new government.</li> <li>2. Reassures neighboring states of continued Soviet benevolent interest.</li> <li>3. Assist local Communists in increasing influence in government.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Deter the formation of opposing internal or external coalition e.g. by propaganda smokescreen stressing "imperialist" intervention and plots against the revolution, criticizing measures against "patriots", denouncing leading anti-Communists.</li> <li>2. Gestures of support for new government e.g. statements, delegations, agreements.</li> <li>3. Warnings against outside intervention and implied willingness to fight to prevent it e.g. statements, demonstrations, talk of "volunteers", troop maneuvers.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Arrival now (if not earlier) of Soviet agents, including third party nationals; plans for seizure of power move ahead.</li> <li>2. Clandestine assistance to CP-led mobs or "peoples armies" e.g. by money, advice, possibly arms.</li> <li>3. Actions and propaganda to maintain atmosphere of terror and confusion.</li> <li>4. Bitter effort to destroy uncooperative officials in key jobs by framed evidence, even murder.</li> <li>5. Efforts to persuade local leadership that it needs Communists to remain in power and save own lives.</li> <li>6. World-wide "front" agitation for "hands off" of country X.</li> </ol>

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VI SUCCESSFUL RESPONSE BY LOCAL GOVERN- MENT: ALTERNATIVE II	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Regime pulls self together.</li> <li>2. Strong measures taken to repress Communists.</li> <li>3. Anti-Western posture modified e.g. overtures for Western assistance.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Reestablish relations of confidence with the regime and other countries in the area.</li> <li>2. Prevent West from capitalizing on situation.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Disavowal of interference or any direct Communist link.</li> <li>2. Other efforts to mollify indignant officials e.g. correspondence between Heads of State.</li> <li>3. Trade and aid policies continue, if temporarily at a slower pace.</li> <li>4. Official "explanation" e.g. in propaganda, is that "imperialists" conspired to discredit Communists and force State to abandon neutrality.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Communists proclaim loyalty to government and assert they will continue to defend the revolution against its enemies.</li> <li>2. Communist leaders may go underground or escape to bloc.</li> <li>3. Reorientation of Party cadres and work follows "self criticism".</li> </ol>